Unemployment Benefits in Labor Controversies: The Anachronisms of the \u3cem\u3eEstablishment\u3c/em\u3e Doctrine by Barker, Robert A.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 3 Article 8 
4-1-1967 
Unemployment Benefits in Labor Controversies: The 
Anachronisms of the Establishment Doctrine 
Robert A. Barker 
New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert A. Barker, Unemployment Benefits in Labor Controversies: The Anachronisms of the Establishment 
Doctrine, 16 Buff. L. Rev. 715 (1967). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol16/iss3/8 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COMMENTARY
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS IN LABOR CONTROVERSIES: THE
ANACHRONISMS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT DOCTRINE
ROBERT A. BArnUm*
W HEN social consciousness and economic necessity reached the point where
it was possible and necessary to enact legislation providing unemployment
benefits for those out of work "through no fault of their own,"' the draftsmen
of the legislation provided for a denial of such benefits in cases of unemployment
due to a labor controversy. The rationale of this exception was that the state
should take a neutral position in labor disputes to ensure that the controversy,
usually manifested in the form of a strike, would not be financed by unemploy-
ment compensation benefits.2 It would seem the intention of the drafters was
that strikers, or those out of work as an incident of a strike, who stood to gain
by the economic pressures being exerted, should not be given an unfair advantage
over management in the give and take of collective bargaining. In short, the
test of whether a claimant, out of work due to a labor controversy, was entitled
to benefits should have depended upon the voluntariness of his unemployment;
the voluntariness being measured either by his participation or interest in the
outcome of the controversy. Voluntariness is, after all, the measure of a claimant's
rights to benefits in any non-labor dispute situation.3
The draftsmen, despite what one might have thought their intent to be,
drew a curiously broad statute which, on its face, has nothing to do with the
voluntariness of the claimant's unemployment or the nature of his involvement
in a labor controversy. Moreover, the statute, New York Labor Law Section 592,
has been interpreted by the courts along lines wholly foreign to any concept of
voluntariness. The statute provides:
Industrial controversy. The accumulation of benefit rights by a
claimant shall be suspended during a period of seven consecutive weeks
beginning with the day after he lost his employment because of a strike,
lockout, or other industrial controversy in the establishment in which
he was employed, except that benefit rights may be accumulated before
the expiration of such seven weeks beginning with the day after such
strike, lockout or other industrial controversy was terminated.4
* Deputy Clerk, Appellate Division, Third Department; Member, New York Bar.
1. The Unemployment Insurance Law is a remedial statute designed to protect the
wage earner from the hazards of unemployment by providing money benefits to individuals
"unemployed through no fault of their own." N.Y. Lab. Law § 501. It was first enacted by
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 468.
2. Matter of Burger, 277 App. Div. 234, 98 N.Y.S.2d 932 (3d Dep't 1950).
3. Only employees who are unemployed through fault of their own-such as employees
who voluntarily quit their jobs or who refuse employment without good cause or who are
discharged for misconduct-are denied benefits under the statute. N.Y. Lab. Law §§ 593, 594.
4. N.Y. Lab. Law § 592(1).
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While similar statutes5 with widely divergent judicial interpretation exist
in other states, the best example of the bad statute literally construed exists in
New York. Because of the wording of the statute itself and the interpretation
given to the term "establishment" by the courts, the provision has failed to serve
the function originally intended by the legislature. In some situations the statute
has been used by the unions as a strike weapon, while in others it has been
worked to withhold unemployment benefits to workers who are involuntarily
unemployed and who have no interest in the outcome of the labor controversy.
Under these circumstances it is difficult to see how the statute can be satisfactory
to labor, management or the general public.
I. THE Establishment CONCEPT
Establishment has been interpreted in New York to mean nothing more
than "geographic location." The first New York interpretation was rendered in
1951 in Matter of Machcinski7 where a strike over local issues occurred at
Michigan plants of the Ford automotive empire. The resulting interruption in
the flow of materials in this highly integrated industrial complex caused workers
at New York plants, who neither participated in the strike nor had an interest
in its outcome, to be laid off. The company argued that establishment should
be construed to mean the whole production complex including the New York
plants, but the Appellate Division, noting that the legislature could have used
the English statute as a model? had it intended to create something other than
a geographic criterion, held that section 592 (1) of the Unemployment Insurance
Law meant exactly what it said-the place where the employee was last employed.
In this particular case the claimants had nothing to do with the strike in
Michigan and stood to gain nothing from it. Thus, they were truly out of
work involuntarily. Accordingly, the court could, without inconsistency, note
the legislative purpose underlying unemployment benefits, i.e., that the public
good and the well-being of the wage earners of the state required the enactment
of this measure for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their
own,0 and apply the geographic interpretation of the statutory term "establish-
ment."
In 1961 the Court of Appeals put its stamp of approval on the geographic in-
terpretation of establishment when, in Matter of Ferrara,'° it decided that all em-
ployees of National Airlines could not be denied benefits for unemployment caused
by a strike of one group. In that case certain clerks employed at what was then
called Idlewild Airport failed to report for work because of stalled contract
negotiations. This action was taken without union authorization. The absence of
S. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 268.09(1) (6) (1959), as interpreted in Adelsman v. Northwest Air-
lines, Inc., 267 Minn. 116, 125 N.W.2d 444 (1963).
6. See Part IV, pp. 722-24 infra.
7. 277 App. Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (3d Dep't 1951).
8. Id. at 638-39, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 212. See infra note 40.
9. Id. at 639-40, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
10. 10 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.E.2d 43, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1961).
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these clerks, along with work stoppage in National's offices located in other states,
caused the suspension of the entire New York operation. As a result hangar
employees at Idlewild, located in a different building than that of the striking
clerks, and clerks in the Manhattan offices were laid off. The Appellate Division
had determined, in line with Mackcinski, that the Manhattan clerks and the
Idlewild hangar employees were entitled to benefits since there was no industrial
controversy in their establishments (locations), but that the Idlewild clerks
would be barred since it was their controversy in their establishment. 11 In
affirming, the Court of Appeals noted the remedial purpose of unemployment
benefits legislation and the fact that in the area of labor relations law there
was an historic policy of governmental neutrality. The Court reasoned that the
suspension of benefits in this area must be narrowly construed in order to give
effect to the remedial aspect of the legislation. Also, since the suspension provi-
sions of section 592 (1) demand no proof of individual participation or financial
interest in the outcome of the controversy, the administrator (the Industrial
Commissioner) is spared the need for making value judgments in assessing the
rights of claimants to benefits; all he need do is follow the literal meaning of
the word "establishment" in determining eligibility. Perhaps with an eye to an-
other case on the docket' 2 the Court noted that in certain situations suspension
may have to be invoked even though the claimants are represented by separate
unions for bargaining purposes. However, the Court did not state whether it
would deny benefits to claimants who were unemployed due to a strike in their
establishment instigated by employees with whom they shared no interest what-
soever.' 3 In Ferrara the Manhattan clerks and the Idlewild clerks were members
of the same union, but since the Idlewild clerks struck without union authoriza-
tion, it does not appear that the Manhattan clerks could be said to be involved in
the controversy or interested in its outcome. Thus there seems to be a tacit
preservation of an involuntariness concept.
The extension of the establishment doctrine is further illustrated in certain
companion cases decided with Ferrara. In Matter of Curatalo'4 the employer
operated a steel fabrication plant and was also engaged in the construction of steel
structures. The employees were divided into two classes: (1) steelworkers who
worked at the plant, and (2) construction workers who were assigned to work
at various construction projects. The construction workers' union called a strike
and the inability of the employer to deliver steel across the picket lines at the
construction sites ultimately led to lay-off of the steelworkers. Since the
industrial controversy was not at the fabrication plant, there was no con-
troversy in that establishment and the Court held that the steelworkers were
entitled to benefits. It does not appear that the steelworkers who received the
11. 11 A.D.2d 171, 202 N.Y.S.2d 869 (3d Dep't 1960).
12. Matter of Gilmartin, 10 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N E.2d 51, 217 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1961). See
p. 721 infra.
13. See Part III, pp. 720-22 infra.
14. 10 N.Y.2d 10, 176 N.E.2d 48, 217 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1961).
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benefits had anything to do with the controversy or had any interest in its out-
come.
In Matter of Wentworth,15 road construction workers were laid off because of
a teamsters' strike involving truck drivers employed by the company furnishing
concrete and the contractor's drivers who carted materials from one part of the
project to another. The Court noted that it was clear that the claimants' loss of
employment was not due to the participation of the job-site drivers in the strike
but, rather, to the cessation of cement deliveries by drivers employed by the
cement company. It was summarily held, although hardly on as clear-cut a set
of circumstances as existed in the other cases, that there was no controversy at
claimants' establishment, apparently some outdoor situs comprising the con-
struction area. At any rate, as in the other cases, claimants' unemployment was
involuntary and their compensation can be said to fully comply with the under-
lying purpose of the law.
II. USE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CONCEPT AS AN
ECONOMIC WEAPON
Preparatory to a nationwide strike against General Motors called by the
United Automobile Workers International Union (UAW) in September, 1964,
the union leaders plotted what was called a "selective strike strategy," i.e.,
one automobile manufacturer at a time would be struck. By allowing other
manufacturers to continue production it was the union's hope that such ongoing
competition would serve as additional pressure in bringing the struck company
to terms. A few of the many plants in General Motors' integrated system, how-
ever, produced parts sold to General Motors' competitors, Chrysler and Ford.
Recognizing that curtailment in that production would, in turn, slow down or
stop production at Chrysler and Ford, thus defeating the whole purpose under-
lying the selective strike strategy, the UAW requested its workers at those
General Motors plants to stay on the job. How long they could do so, of course,
was problematical since continued operation of those plants was dependent upon
the flow of material from other General Motors plants which would be struck.
With respect to this, the following appeared in a UAW publication addressed to
its members: "How long we can operate without layoffs in certain areas of the
plant is highly speculative. We have been assured of your eligibility for N.Y.
State unemployment compensation benefits by recent Court decisions."163 Thus
the union recognized openly that its selective strike strategy could be financed,
in part at least, by unemployment benefits.
The Maclwinski and Ferrara decisions, of course, gave a basis to this advice,
but it was not until the Court of Appeals' decision in Matter of George'7 that
it became apparent that employees of an integrated, multi-plant industry
15. 10 N.Y.2d 13, 176 N.E.2d 50, 217 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1961).
16. Brief for appellant, General Motors Corporation, p. 10, Matter of Weis, 26 A.D.2d
414, 274 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1966).
17. 14 N.Y.2d 234, 199 N.E.2d 503, 250 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1964).
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represented by a single union could be awarded unemployment benefits even if
their unemployment resulted from a strike participated in initially by these
employees. In October 1958, UAW employees left employment in every one of
General Motors' plants throughout the country. The national issues were soon
settled, but strikes continued at the local level until local unions, on a piecemeal
basis, reached agreements. Claimants' local unions reached agreement at the
plants around the Buffalo, New York, area fairly quickly. The strikes at those
plants were settled, both nationally and locally, and the claimants were ready to
return to work. They remained unemployed, however, because the continuing
strikes at other General Motors plants had halted the flow of material necessary
to keep all the plants in this functionally integrated industry in operation. The
Appellate Division held that these employees, who had themselves participated
in the nationwide strike called by their international union, were not entitled to
benefits. Noting that claimants must have been fully aware of the probable delay
in resumption of employment caused by such a strike against interdependent
factories, the court stated: "Their [claimants'] unemployment during the period
for which they have been granted benefits was the direct and inevitable con-
sequence of the strike in which they joined. They are not innocent victims of a
situation wholly beyond their control, and their unemployment may not be said
to be involuntary."' 8
In reversing, the Court of Appeals stated:
The Appellate Division ...erred, in our view, in attributing a
vicarious voluntariness to the post-settlement unemployment on the
ground that, when they commenced the strike, the claimants ought
to have foreseen the consequences of idleness in some plants of an
integrated industrial enterprise. The statute in question expressly limits
such considerations to single "establishments." There can be little doubt
that, under our cases, delays caused by lack of parts and supplies from
other idle plants are no part of the termination of an industrial con-
troversy in an establishment that has settled its own controversy. ...
[E]mployees in an establishment in which no dispute presently exists,
even though they were participants in the initial multi-plant con-
troversy, are not denied benefits where their unemployment is traceable
solely to a controversy in another establishment.19
A variation on the 1958 General Motors strike situation arose out of the
1961 strike of the same employer. As in George there were national and -local is-
sues to be settled. Locals came to terms separately at the three New York plants
which were involved, but the national agreement was not signed for some days.
While workers were ready and willing to return to work at the time their local dis-
putes were settled, all of them were not able to do so because of the necessity of
having gradually to restart the furnaces in each of the establishments. General
Motors argued that unlike the situation in George where the delay in work re-
sumption was due to lack of material caused by the continuing strikes in other es-
18. 15 A.D.2d 308, 309, 223 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (3d Dep't 1962).
19. 14 N.Y.2d 234, 239-40, 199 N.E.2d 503-05, 250 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424-25 (1964).
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tablishments, the delay in work resumption here was due to the delays indigenous
to each establishment wherein there surely had been an industrial controversy.
The causal relationship was more direct here than in George-the delay in re-
sumption of work caused by the industrial controversy could be traced directly, in
each establishment, to the participation of the employees in that controversy. The
Appellate Division, however, affirmed the allowance of benefits since the industrial
controversy had, in fact, ended at the establishments and there was no room for
any concept of "vacarious voluntariness" with regard to the post-settlement
unemployment under the Court of Appeals' edict in George.20
Thus, as noted at the outset of this section, in preparing for the 1964 auto-
mobile strike, the union was able to instruct those members who were requested
to stay in employment so that parts would be produced for General Motors'
competitors, that if they were laid off it was likely they could receive unemploy-
ment benefits under the above mentioned court decisions. There indeed was a
strike in 1964, and workers who stayed on the job at specified plants as part of
the union's overall strike strategy did apply for benefits when they were laid
off. Their awards were granted and, as predicted by the union, were upheld 2 1
for the days of unemployment occurring both before and after the date of the
national strike settlement and the signing of the contracts locally at their own
plants. Since there had been no industrial controversy in their particular establish-
ments, their unemployment was compensable even though the lack of a con-
troversy at these establishments was a calculated maneuver by the union to give it
a stronger hand in the negotiation process.
III. DEPRIVATION OF BENEFITS TO THOSE INVOLUNTARILY UNEMPLOYED
That the test of voluntariness generally applicable in the New York Unem-
ployment Insurance Law has found no place in industrial controversy cases is
graphically pointed out in the General Motors strike cases related above. In
those cases the adoption of the geographic test resulted in providing the unions
with a new economic weapon. In several cases, however, the geographic test
has worked to deny benefits to claimants because there was an industrial con-
troversy in the establishment in which they worked. These benefits were
denied despite the fact that their unemployment was involuntary in every con-
ceivable way.
The first such case was Matter of Lasher2 The claimants were employees
of Bethlehem Steel who went from site to site performing steel erection work.
While the claimants were engaged in the construction of approaches to open
hearth furnaces at Bethlehem's Lackawanna, New York, plant, the permanent
employees at the Lackawanna plant struck, causing the claimants to be laid off.
Bethlehem's employees and the claimants were represented by different unions
20. Matter of Acquisto, 25 A.D.2d 326, 269 N.Y.S.2d 567 (3d Dep't), leave to appeal
denied, 18 N.Y.2d 577 (1966).
21. Matter of Weis, 26 A.D.2d 414, 274 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1966).
22. 279 App. Div. 505, 111 N.Y.S.2d 356 (3d Dep't 1952).
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and the claimants neither participated in the instigation of the strike nor stood
to gain or lose from the contract terms hinging on the strike's outcome. The
Appellate Division, noting that voluntariness was not a criterion under section
592 (1), held simply that since the controversy occurred in the establishment at
which the claimants were last employed they would not be eligible for benefits
if their unemployment was due to the strike.23
In Matter of Gilmartin,24 a companion case to Ferrara, claimant was em-
ployed by a manufacturer of concrete products. A Lathers' Union representative
demanded that the employer hire a member of that union to operate a certain
lathe. The employer refused and the Lathers' Union enlisted the aid of the Team-
sters' Union which ordered its drivers to refuse to deliver concrete to the em-
ployer. Claimant and his fellow workers were members of other unions and had
no interest in the labor controversy which forced their lay-off. There being a
controversy at claimant's establishment, the Court of Appeals held claimant was
not entitled to benefits even though this unemployment was involuntary in the
truest sense of the word.
Another General Motors case, having nothing to do with the nationwide
strikes pertinent to the cases discussed above,2 5 illustrates the counterpart to
those situations. In Matter of Carmack2 6 there were two General Motors plants
under separate management divisions located in two buildings at one site. The
Fisher Body Division was in one building and the Chevrolet Motor Division
was in the other. The buildings were connected by a tunnel housing the main
assembly line. Fisher automobile bodies moved out of the Fisher building,
through the tunnel and into the Chevrolet building where they were joined to the
Chevrolet chassis and components. From twelve to fifteen Fisher employees
worked in the Chevrolet building inspecting Fisher bodies as they came through
the tunnel into the Chevrolet plant. Although the production was integrated,
the management was separate, as were the unions. The Fisher employees struck,
causing the Chevrolet employees to be laid off. Because Fisher employees worked
in the Chevrolet establishment, the Appellate Division held that there was a con-
troversy in that establishment thereby rendering the Chevrolet employees, in-
voluntarily unemployed, ineligible for benefits.2 7
23. Since the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board had not specifically found that
the shortage of steel was due to the steelworker's strike, the case was remanded for a finding
on that point. In order for workers to be disqualified under N.Y. Lab. Law § 592(1), it must
be found, in addition to the fact that the controversy occurred in the pertinent establishment,
that the unemployment was due to a "strike, lockout or other industrial controversy" and
that determination had not been made by the fact finders.
24. 10 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.E.2d 51, 217 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1961).
25. See Matter of George, 14 N.Y.2d 234, 199 N.E.2d 503, 250 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1964),
discussed supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text; Matter of Acquisto, 25 A.D.2d 326, 269
N.Y.S.2d 567 (3d Dep't 1966), discussed supra note 20 and accompanying text; Matter of
Weis, 26 A.D.2d 414, 274 N.Y.S.2d 794 (3d Dep't 1966), discussed supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
26. 19 A.D.2d 766, 241 N.Y.S.2d 993 (3d Dep't 1963), aff'd mere., 15 N.Y.2d 768, 205
N.E.2d 532, 257 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1965).
27. Had it not been for this presence of Fisher employees in the Chevrolet plant a
perplexing geographical question would have arisen with respect to establishment because of
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In Matter of CohnPs claimant was laid off because of a strike against another
employer in the same establishment in which he worked. Even though his own
employer was a corporate subsidiary of the struck employer, and the operation at
this establishment was an integrated process involving both parent and sub-
sidiary, there was no proof of claimant's interest or participation in the strike,
but then there did not have to be. Establishment being the sole criterion, claim-
ant was denied benefits.
IV. THE LAW IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The anomaly presented in New York where, because of the establishment
provision, voluntary unemployment is often rewarded and involuntary unemploy-
ment is often penalized, is found elsewhere as well. In states saddled with the
establishment provision, the concept of what constitutes an establishment varies.
In opposition to the New York test based solely on geographic location, the test
in Ohio was whether two or more plants, regardless of physical separation, were
functionally integrated, i.e., whether continued production at one plant depended
on continued production at another of the employer's plants. This being the case
the two (or more) plants constituted one establishment. Consequently, claimants
involuntarily laid off at one plant with no interest in the outcome of a strike
at the other plant were denied benefits.2 9 More recently, however, Ohio has come
over to something akin to New York's geographic test by holding that establish-
ment relates to physical place of business.30
The Michigan courts became so entangled over the definition of establish-
ment that the legislature finally revamped the disqualification statute.3 1 At one
point the functional integration test was the only one used,32 but this test was
relaxed some years later when the court undertook to account for such multiple
factors as physical proximity of separate plants and local plant management, as
well as funtional integration.33 Very recently, however, while still applying the
prior Michigan establishment provision, it was held that the terms of a national
collective bargaining agreement extending a strike at one bargaining unit to all
bargaining units at different establishments, extended the industrial controversy
to the other establishments at least at the point when layoffs occurred. This, in
the presence of two plants under separate management located at one site but connected by an
assembly line.
28. 24 A.D.2d 298, 265 N.Y.S.2d 765 (3d Dep't 1965).
29. Adamski v. Ohio, 108 Ohio App. 198, 161 N.E.2d 907 (1959). For further discussion
of Adamski see Note, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (1960); 4l. Baumgarte v. Board of Review, 21
Ohio Op. 2d 52, 186 N.E.2d 146 (1961).
30. Abnie v. Ford Motor Co., 175 Ohio St. 273, 194 N.E.2d 136 (1963). Even though
the employer conducted an integrated business where all plants were interdependent, em-
ployees who became unemployed at an Ohio plant because of a strike in Michigan were
entitled to benefits.
31. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.531(29) (1) (b) (Supp. 1963), Mich. Pub. Acts 1963, No. 226
§ 29(1) (b).
32. Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich. 438, 298 NAV. 87 (1941).
33. Park v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 355 Mich. 103, 94 NAV.2d 407 (1959).
722
COMMENTARY
effect, caused a waiver of benefits by operation of the collective bargaining con-
tract. No regard was given to anything but the contract.34
Other jurisdictions employ similar tests to define establishment. In Min-
nesota and Kentucky the courts rely more on a comprehensive test,35 while the
functional integration test has been used in Connecticut.36
The California courts, with not quite so stringent an establishment provision
as in New York,3 7 have taken a more realistic approach. In Gardner v. State
Dir. of Emp.38 restaurant unions seeking a more favorable contract with the
restaurant owners' association struck certain key restaurants. The association
had previously announced its intention to consider a strike against one member
a strike against all members and carried out this threat by laying off all employ-
ees. The California Supreme Court upheld the Appeals Board ruling that laid-off
employees, locked out because of their union's strike called at other restaurants,
were not entitled to benefits since they had voluntarily left their work because of
a trade dispute. The court realistically assessed the situation and pointed out
that the union employees, having used the economic weapon first, were responsible
for the foreseeable reprisals and therefore were "voluntarily" out of employment.
The California rationale of fixing responsibility against the party who first
invokes a weapon leading to a labor controversy can hardly be faulted and is
shown to be far superior to the other criteria discussed for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to invoke the disqualification provision.39 A statute without an
establishment provision, such as the English model,40 is obviously preferable.
Although Michigan, in an attempt to unsnarl the interpretation of its statute by
new legislation, retained the establishment concept, it made disqualification de-
34. General Motors Corp. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 376 Mich. 135, 135 N.W.2d
921 (1965). But see Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Vulcan Forging Co., 375 Mich. 374, 134
N.W.2d 749 (1965). See Note, 12 Wayne L. Rev. 710 (1966).
35. Adelsman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 Minn. 116, 125 N.W.2d 444 (1963);
Snook v. International Harvester Co., 276 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1955).
36. Alvarez v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 327, 93 A.2d 298 (1952).
37. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 1262 (1956) states: "An individual is not eligible for
unemployment compensation benefits, and no such benefits shall be payable to him, if he
left his work because of a trade dispute. Such individual shall remain ineligible for the
period during which he continues out of work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is
still in active progress in the establishment in which he was employed."
38. 53 Cal. 2d 23, 346 P.2d 193 (1959).
39. For a fuller discussion of the Gardner case see Note, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 145 (1960).
See also Coast Packing Co. v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeal Bd., 410 P.2d 358, 48 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1966).
40. This statute is outlined at length in Matter of Machcinski, 277 App. Div. 634, 638-
39, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208, 212 (3d Dep't 1951). The statute (British Unemployment Insurance
Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55) provides that where separate branches of work which are
commonly carried on as separate businesses in separate premises are in any case carried on in
separate departments on the same premises, each of those departments shall be deemed a
separate factory or work shop, as the case may be. It also contains provisions to the effect
that the suspension shall not apply if the claimant is not participating in or financially or
directly interested in the dispute which caused the work stoppage and does not belong to
a class of workers who participated in the dispute. It is pointed out by the court in Machcin-
ski, id. at 639, 102 N.Y.S.2d at 212, that in 1936 the Federal Social Security Board prepared
a "draft bill" modeled after the English statute and that many states adopted this model
almost verbatim. See Stewart, Planning and Administration of Unemployment Compensation
in the United States 28 (1938).
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pend on the nature of a claimant's involvement in the controversy. This is, in ef-
fect, an adoption of a voluntariness test.41 The Arizona statute, based on the
English statute, probably comes as close to simplicity as possible while making
voluntariness the main criterion.
42
V. CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in the Ferrara case noted, in support of its limited
interpretation of establishment, that "it is of some relevance that the Legislature
has resisted a number of attempts, first initiated shortly after the Machcinski
decision, to amend the statute so as to extend the scope and content of the term
'establishment' and the consequent suspension of benefits." 43 Examination of the
unadopted amendments indeed shows that legislative attempts were made to
extend the concept so that workers at one plant laid off because of a dispute at
another of the employer's plants would be denied benefits. 44 These amendments
would have served to curb the use of unemployment benefits as an economic
weapon in a nation-wide strike situation where, under the existing statute, work-
ers who participated initially and/or stood to gain from continuing strikes else-
where can receive benefits.45 But these proposed amendments would have ag-
41. Mich. Pub. Acts 1963, No. 226 sec. 29(1) (b), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.531(29) (1) (b)
(Supp. 1963) goes on at great length in setting disqualification standards and criteria.
42. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-777(A) (1956) reads:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for any week with respect to
which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a
labor dispute, strike or lockout which exists at the factory, establishment or other
premises at which he is or was last employed. This provision shall not apply if It
is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that the individual is not participating
in, financing or directly interested in the labor dispute . . . or that he does not
belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commence-
ment of the labor dispute .. . there were members employed at the premises at
which the labor dispute ... occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or
directly interested in the dispute, strike or lockout....
For an interpretation see Various Claimants & Constr. Union v. Employment Sec. Comm n,
92 Ariz. 183, 375 P.2d 380 (1962). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 223(d) (1950).
43. Matter of Ferrara, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 176 N.E.2d 43, 48, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (1961).
44. To the existing wording of § 592(1) in the first four amendment attempts would
have been added: "When an employer operates two or more premises, wherever situated,
in the conduct of his business, they shall be considered one establishment for the purpose
of this section, if a labor dispute at one of the premises causes unemployment at the other."
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gravated the inequity inherent in situations where workers are laid off due to a
dispute, either in their own or different plants, in which they have no interest.40
In short, these proposals would not have brought the criterion for denial of
benefits for unemployment due to labor disputes into line with the voluntariness
test used in other unemployment benefit situations.47
It is not impossible to maintain the state's neutral position in labor con-
troversies and at the same time carry forth the underlying purpose of the Un-
employment Insurance Law, which is to protect individuals unemployed through
no fault of their own. It is difficult to understand, for example, how the award
of unemployment benefits to the Chevrolet employees in the Carmack4" case
would have aided or hindered the labor dispute involving the Fisher employees
who were in a totally separate bargaining situation. As noted, a realistic approach
to involuntary unemployment due to labor disputes has been adopted in other
jurisdictions. 49 While the California courts have wisely found room for a volun-
tariness test in interpreting their statute,50 that statute is not totally free from
the possibility of such restrictive interpretations as the New York geographic
location test. 1 Consequently a California-type statute is not ideally suited to
the furtherance of the cause of the voluntariness test. There appears to be no
substitute for the English statute which is based wholly on the criterion of volun-
tariness,5 2 unless it is the fairly simple and clear-cut version adopted by the
Arizona Legislature. 3 The latter appears adequate and far superior to the rather
intricate statute finally enacted in Michigan.54
The law in New York, of course, has fossilized to the point where there is
no alternative to a legislative amendment eradicating the anomalous situation
presented above. It is time New York parted company with those states out of
step with the underlying concept of unemployment benefits and joined those
jurisdictions which have adopted a realistic approach to the labor dispute ques-
tion.
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